STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, Sc. SUPERIOR COURT JAMES W. ARCHER) VS.) PC/2002-5593 WILLIAM A. MacGARRY)

HEARD BEFORE JUSTICE STEPHEN FORTUNATO, JR. NOVEMBER 26, 2002

APPEARANCES:

DAVID STRACHMAN, ESQ., FOR THE PLAINTIFF

CHRIS O'CONNOR, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

PATTI M. AHEARN, RPR COURT REPORTER

CERTIFICATION

I, PATTI M. AHEARN hereby certify that the following pages, 1 thru 23, inclusive, is a true and accurate transcript, according to my stenographic notes.

PATITI M. AHEARN, CSR, RPR

COURT REPORTER

NOVEMBER 26, 2002

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THE CLERK: James W. Archer versus William A. MacGarry, PC/2002-5593. Your names for the record.

MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the petitioner.

MR. O'CONNOR: Chris O'Connor for Chief MacGarry.

THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, I've read your thorough and thoughtful briefs on this matter. so sure that there is any factual dispute of any sort here unless it's the Defendant's contention that somehow or other the Town Council has transmographied or morphed into some sort of a police commissioner's board, and, therefore, is one of the licensing authorities defined in 11-47-2 Section 5. But other than that, I don't know if there's any factual disputes.

MR. O'CONNOR: I don't know that there is. taken the position, however, your Honor, that the Town Council is the appropriate licensing authority for the Town of Smithfield. I'm well aware of the statute, the statute giving authority to the local level to issue a licensing permit. And, our position is simply stated as it is in the memo, which is that although we acknowledge that there is no explicit ordinance in the Town of Smithfield that says the Town Council shall be the licensing authority, just as there is no ordinance that says the Chief of Police shall be, that there is a

catch-all ordinance in our Home Charter that we referred
to which suggests that authority in the absence of
exclusive authority rests with the Town Council, and I

4 know that my brother vehemently opposes that position.

THE COURT: Yes. And the legislature has defined licensing authority as meaning -- or as being possibly several different categories of people. One of whom is the Chief of Police or Superintendent of Police of other cities and towns having a regular organized police force. While it is clear, and I don't think anybody is going to contradict the fact that Smithfield, indeed, has a regular organized police force chief, the Defendant, William A. MacGarry, is, indeed, the Chief of that police force, and a licensing authority can also be a Board of Police Commissioners of a city or town where that Board has been instituted. There is no such Board in the Town of Smithfield; is there, Mr. O'Connor?

MR. O'CONNOR: No, there is not.

THE COURT: Well, I think, then, the plaintiffs have named the appropriate defendant here, and that means we must now proceed to the question as to whether or not he can take the position that he clearly has based upon the communication he had with Mr. Archer; namely, that his policy and practice over the years has been -- and I'm referring to his February 22nd, 2002,

letter that he sent on his official stationery to Mr. Archer, which he said, among other things, quoting from the letter, "Although by law I, as the Chief of Police, have the authority to issue such permits, it has been my policy not to do so, and I've never issued any such permits." And, now, the question is whether he can take that position lawfully. Meaning, can he not do something that the statute says, and it uses the word shall, meaning the -- in so many words, "The police chief shall issue these permits if there is an application and if the applicant meets the criteria." want to emphasize for everybody that what I'm being asked to do, as I understand it, is simply start the application process at the level of Police Chief in Smithfield. I'm not in any way intruding upon the domain of discretion. I'm not being asked to intrude upon the domain of discretion that the chief has regarding whether Mr. Archer is a so-called suitable person or meets any other criteria that are set forward in the legislation for the issuance of a permit for a concealed weapon. But that being the framework in which we operate, I would be happy to hear some arguments. They need not be extensive in light of your thorough briefs, but if you want to highlight any of your points, you may.

I was especially intrigued by Mr. O'Connor's argument that somehow there is another adequate remedy of law; namely, the avenue of going to the Attorney General. Let me suggest that that is not an adequate remedy of law. That is a separate avenue for application, but I take the equitable doctrine of adequacy of remedy of law to mean whether or not the courts can do something for the plaintiff in this controversy other than issue a mandamus, assuming the criteria for that are met, directing the police chief to do what the statute says he's supposed to do as one of his functions as a chief of police.

MR. O'CONNOR: I suppose that puts the burden on me to probably persuade you otherwise, and I'll be brief because there is not much more than I think I can add other than what is in my brief, and I don't want to be redundant, but I didn't want to necessarily give up that easily on the issue of the proper licensing authority, and I understand that you not only have the authority to determine what the law is in this case, but you're sitting as the trier of fact in this regard as well.

We have taken the position that the Town Council is the proper licensing authority, and we stick by that determination and I respect the fact that you have a different opinion as the trier of fact regarding that,

 but I do believe that within the confines of that statute that it does permit any other body authorized by the city or town charter to act as the local licensing department, so I would say that is the town.

Irrespective of what the Chief of Police's interpretation of what the law may be, clearly there is no dispute of what he said in his letter is that he believes he is authorized by law to do it, but whether his belief -- regardless of what his belief is, I would say it is irrelevant because what is at issue here is whether he is authorized, in fact, to do it by law, and that's your determination.

I would simply state, your Honor, that this plaintiff has had some eight months to make application to the Attorney General's Office, and he has failed to do that. It is the same application, although the process may be different in terms of the criteria used by the Attorney General's Office and the criteria used at the local level, it is the same type of license. He has chosen not to do that. Instead, he's chosen to seek recourse from this Court. Clearly, if he made application to the Attorney General's Office and was denied, we would have no -- at the local level, we would have no discretion but to at least accept and consider his application, but he has had plenty of opportunity to

make application to the Attorney General, and for whatever reason, he has elected not to.

Your Honor, I don't want to be redundant. I'll rest on what we submitted in the brief, and I don't believe that there is factually that much in dispute. I thank you for your consideration.

THE COURT: All right. Counselor.

MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you, your Honor. I also don't want to add much more than what was in my reply brief which we filed with the Court on Friday. The argument that I think intrigued your Honor, and as you indicated as to the separate avenue, I think we've dispelled in our reply brief by showing very clearly that there are some significant distinctions between the types of licenses issued by the Attorney General and the license issued by the cities and towns.

And as to the facts, my brother and I have spent a little time this morning trying to work out some stipulations, and despite a very cooperative relationship, there are few very minor factual issues. If your Honor feels that it would be helpful, I would like to have the chief testify for about five or ten minutes on his past practice, the practice of the town, and that is it, I don't really think there is much else.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

1 MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you. Chief. 2 WILLIAM MacGARRY, called as a witness, first having been 3 duly sworn, testified as follows: 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STRACHMAN: 5 Chief MacGarry, how long have you been the Police Chief for the Town of Smithfield? 6 7 Approximately six-and-one-half years. 8 You were appointed in July of '96? June of '96. 9 10 And prior to that, did you serve -- where did you serve? 11 I retired from the Rhode Island State Police after 25 12 years of service. 13 And, your next employment in law enforcement was with 14 the Town? 15 Yes. 16 And, from the time when you were first appointed, as 17 part of your duties did you learn anything from your 18 predecessor of the practice in the town concerning the 19 issuance of gun licenses pursuant to local -- the state 20 statute by your town? 21 No, not really. 22 Did you inquire of your predecessor? 23 No, I did not. Α 24 And, from the time that you were appointed in 1996, did 25 you begin the process of accepting either applications

- 1 or requests for applications?
- 2 A We really didn't have a process.
- 3 Q There was no process?
- 4 A That's correct.
- 5 Q Okay. In 1996, 1997, 1998, did you from time to time
- 6 receive requests for applications?
- 7 A On rare occasions I received requests for applications,
- 8 yes.
- 9 Q And, did you ever issue applications?
- 10 A No, sir, I did not.
- 11 Q Is it fair to say, then, that during the entirety of
- 12 your term you have not issued an application?
- 13 A Yes, that is fair to say.
- 14 Q And, is it fair to say that you've taken a similar
- position to the -- over time to the -- to your letter of
- 16 February of this year to the plaintiff?
- 17 A I'm not sure I understand that question.
- 18 Q In your letter of February of this year, you indicated
- that it has been your policy, your practice, not to
- 20 issue licenses; is that right?
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 Q And, has that been your policy and practice from 1996
- 23 forward?
- 24 A I've never issued a license.
- 25 Q So, it has been your policy never to issue licenses?

Α 1 Yes. 2 THE COURT: Have you ever entertained an 3 application? 4 THE WITNESS: We have had a few inquiries over the 5 years as to how to get a license, and I've referred 6 those people to the Rhode Island Attorney General's 7 Office. 8 BY MR. STRACHMAN: 9 But when people have applied to you, like Mr. Archer, 10 and have said, "Chief, you have the authority pursuant 11 to this statute, will you entertain an application?" It 12 is fair to say that it has been your policy to respond? 13 I'm not exercising that authority. 14 MR. O'CONNOR: Objection to the form of the 15 question, the characterization. 16 THE COURT: Well, he can answer and qualify it as 17 he sees fit. Go ahead. 18 I've never issued a concealed weapons permit. 19 a couple of inquiries over the last six-and-a-half 20 years, and my recollection is that I referred them to 21 the Attorney General's Department. 22 So, you don't issue permits, but you THE COURT: 23 also don't issue applications? You don't have an 24 application form at your department to apply to those

seeking a gun permit in your capacity as Chief of

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1 Police? 2 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 3 THE COURT: Nor do you, in effect, say to a person, 4 "Well, just right write to me in your own format as to your application"? In other words, you don't entertain 5 applications? 6 7 THE WITNESS: That is fair to say. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you. 10 And, do you serve for a period -- a term, a two-year 11 term, a three-year term? 12 I serve at the pleasure of the town manager. 13 And, that has been continuous? In other words, not for 14 a period of -- you don't have a contract that has been 15 renewed or --16 Yes, I do have a contract. 17 And what term is that contract? 18 MR. O'CONNOR: I object. It is not relevant. 19 THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 20 I currently have a four-year contract that expires, I 21 think, about three-and-a-half years. 22 So, it -- and your process, or your policy of not 23 entertaining or granting licenses for concealed weapons, 24 is that something that is public, that is not something 25 that is hidden? In other words, have you discussed that

1		with people in the Town Council? Have you discussed
2		that with other members, other employees of the Town?
3		MR. O'CONNOR: I object to the form of the
4		question.
5		THE COURT: Sustained as to form.
6	Q	Have you discussed your policy concerning gun licenses
7		with other employees of the town?
8	A	Yes, the Town Solicitor's Office.
9	Q	And, that policy has been consistent for the
10	! !	six-and-a-half years that you've served; is that
11		correct?
12	A	We only received, I think, an inquiry as recently as
13		our first inquiry may be as recently as a couple of
14		years ago.
15	Q	But your policy hasn't changed?
16	A	Our policy hasn't changed in that we don't issue those
17		licenses.
18	Q	Okay. And you weren't
19		THE COURT: I think we've covered this. How much
20		longer are you going to be here, Counselor?
21		MR. STRACHMAN: Very briefly, Judge.
22	Q	And you haven't been reprimanded by the Town Council or
23		informed by the Town Council that it is inappropriate
24	}	the way you're handling this; have you?
25		MR. O'CONNOR: Objection.

1 THE COURT: What does this have to do with 2 anything? 3 MR. STRACHMAN: It is significant for the practice. 4 THE COURT: He said what his practice is. We don't 5 know what his practice is. 6 MR. STRACHMAN: The chief is now saying the town 7 has the authority, and, yet, I've been acting this way 8 for six-and-a-half years. His contract is renewed --9 THE COURT: He hasn't discussed it with anybody 10 other than the town solicitor, so why pursue this? 11 And, have you had occasion to accept renewal applications? In other words, applications that came 12 13 for maybe the term of your predecessor that expires 14 during your term? 15 MR. O'CONNOR: I object. It is not relevant. 16 THE COURT: Overruled. 17 Not that I'm apparently aware of. 18 And, does the Town -- does your department or the Town 19 have a Registry somewhere where the license holders are 20 identified? 21 Not that I'm aware of. 22 That's all, your Honor. Thank you. MR. STRACHMAN: 23 THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. O'Connor? 24 MR. O'CONNOR: Just a couple. 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. O'CONNOR:

1	Q	Chief MacGarry, you indicated that you have had some
2		contact with the Town Solicitor. Which Town solicitor
3		are you referring to?
4	A	Ed Alves who was the former Town Solicitor before
5		Warren Rosenbaum.
6	Q	Mr. Alves was the former solicitor of the Town of
7		Smithfield; is that correct?
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	At some point in 1999 you made inquiry of Mr. Alves
10		concerning the authority concerning who has the
11		authority to issue a concealed weapon permit; is that
12		correct?
13		MR. STRACHMAN: Objection.
14		THE COURT: Overruled.
15	A	Yes, that is correct.
16	Q	And, did you receive a response?
17	A	Yes, I received a written response.
18	Q	And, what was the response?
19		MR. STRACHMAN: Objection.
20		THE COURT: Overruled.
21	А	It my recollection that the letter that he sent to me
22		said that I don't have the authority to consider a
23		concealed weapon permit, that that authority rests in
24		the Smithfield Town Council.
25		MR. O'CONNOR: Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STRACHMAN: 3 And, despite receiving that information from the Town 4 Council, you considered -- from 1999 forward, you 5 considered yourself as possessing that authority; is 6 that right? 7 I'm not really sure right now whether I possess that 8 authority or that authority rests in the Town Council, I 9 really don't know. 10 But you had a communication with the Town's lawyer in 11 1999, you continued to describe your authority, at least 12 in public with people like Mr. Archer, as if you had 13 that authority, and that is exactly what you wrote in 14 February of 2002; is that right? 15 MR. O'CONNOR: I object to the form of the 16 question, the characterization. 17 THE COURT: Overruled. If the Chief understands 18 what he's being asked he can answer. 19 Yes. 20 MR. O'CONNOR: No further questions. 21 THE COURT: All right. Chief, thank you. You may 22 step down. 23 In this matter the Plaintiff, a THE COURT: 24 resident of Smithfield, seeks to avail himself of 25 11-47-1 et sequitur, in particular 11-47-11, which

provides that if a person meets certain criteria, then the licensing authority, quoting from the statute,
"...shall issue a license or permit to the person to carry concealed upon his or her person a pistol or revolver everywhere within this state for four years from the date of issue." End of quote, and then it continues on. The licensing authority is defined by our legislature in 11-47-2, Part 5, and among the licensing authorities is the Chief of Police of our cities and towns, in this case the Town of Smithfield.

Now, it is possible to have a licensing authority other than the Chief of Police in a given town or city, but that must be brought about in a formal fashion by the appropriate officials in the Town. That Part 5 that I just referenced says that licensing authority can mean, among other things, quote, "The Board of Police Commissioners of a City or Town where that Board has been instituted." End of quote. Mr. O'Connor candidly states in answer to a question from the Court that there is no such Board of Police Commissioners in the Town of Smithfield, nor is there anything in the Charter or Ordinances that suggest in any way that the Town Council functions as the Board of Police Commissioners. event, as the chief stated, he negotiates his contract with, and, apparently, answers to the town manager.

There is no question, though, that William MacGarry is, indeed, the Chief of Police in Smithfield, and given the way that the Ordinances and Charter are structured in that Town, he's the licensing authority.

Now, I'm very mindful that a Superior Court Judge cannot take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. On the other hand, nothing has been called to my attention that would in any way contradict the candid representations of Mr. O'Connor or, indeed, the testimony, which, of course, I find to be credible, of Chief MacGarry. So, the only evidence before the Court in this matter leads me to the irresistible conclusion that the Chief is the licensing authority in Smithfield. That having been determined, the question now is does the Chief have any discretion relative to entertaining applications and processing the applications pursuant to 11-47-11.

There is, indeed, some discretion vested in the licensing authority, and in this case, the chief. A licensing authority must consider upon the receipt of an application for a gun permit what the legislature says the licensing authority must consider. Quoting from the statute, "If it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear an injury to his or her person or property, or has any other appropriate reason for

carrying a pistol or revolver, and that he or she is a suitable person to be licensed..." End of quote, then the license shall issue. If the person is a suitable person and meets the other criteria that I just quoted from the statute, at that point there is no discretion on the part of the licensing authority. According to the legislature at that point the permit shall issue. Not may, but shall. But, as I say, in the domain of whether the person is a suitable person or has proved that they are -- have a legitimate fear for their safety or some other reason, and to this I think we would apply the criteria that the licensing authority would have to act in a reasonable fashion, we could not impute to the legislature the intent to vest in licensing authorities some power to act in an irrational or arbitrary fashion, and we know in State Versus Storm, 112 RI, a Supreme Court decision, that the Supreme Court, quite understandably, concluded that appropriate licensing authorities includes, among others, law enforcement officials. Who better than they would know whether or not the person has done what else they are required to do as the statute suggests, such as go through a training process and get duly certified and all the rest of it. As the Supreme Court said, they are in a particularly appropriate position to run the background

checks and check on the applicant and so on. But the question remains, though the licensing authorities have the discretion I just alluded to, do they have the discretion to say, "I'm not going to exercise my statutory power. I'm not going to entertain applications. Moreover, no way, no how, am I ever going to issue a permit pursuant to 11-27-11."

I do not believe that the police chiefs who happen to serve as a licensing authority, such as Chief MacGarry, I don't believe they have that power, any more than they have the authority to say that I believe a particular misdemeanor criminal statute is ridiculous and stupid and it is a waste of our time to enforce it and to walk away and to direct his subordinates to walk away from a clear violation of that particular misdemeanor statute or ordinance. It is not for the chief to pick and choose what statutes will be enforced.

I realize there is a lot of discretion enjoyed by police officers as to whether to arrest or not, whether to tell the people to move on, you're blocking the doorway, or to arrest them for blocking the doorway.

I'm speaking of a situation where the police says, "In no circumstances, in no circumstances will I ever enforce this ordinance. It is so stupid." Or, "This statute, it is so stupid." I might say that same

criteria applies to judges. I'm sure that you will find among the judges on the Superior Court opinions that certain statutes are ridiculous and really have no place — they should not be tying up either the police officers or the Courts. But if someone is arrested under these, I'm certainly speaking in the large part about misdemeanor statutes. If the arrest is made and someone is brought before the Court, the Court has to process the case, and that's the end of the discussion, just as pretty much the end of the discussion regarding whether or not the Chiefs of Police in the State must entertain these applications that are presented to them.

It is true -- let me just say that our Supreme Court has had occasion in other matters to define the receipt by municipal officials of an application for a particular permit, have defined those responsibilities as being ministerial and non discretionary. Some of these cases were cited by the Plaintiff in his brief,

Nowman Versus Mayor of the City of Newport where the Court said, the Supreme Court said, "The petitioners have a clear right to compel the commissioner to perform his ministerial duty in accordance with the law; namely, to consider petitioner's application and to exercise his discretion reasonably in the matter." In a similar case, not exactly on point, but Corrente versus

Southworth, 448 A2d, 769, the Supreme Court said,

"Although the public officer may exercise a

discretionary function, that discretion may not be so

boundless and uncontrolled as to allow the official to

negate and nullify a statutorily established merit

Here, we have a system for licensing of concealed weapons. A person can apply, to be sure, to the Attorney General, and it may well be that the Attorney General has more discretion under the statute than does the Chief of Police, but that aside, the legislature saw fit to give to the citizens two prongs or two paths that they may follow toward the objective of getting a gun permit, and it is not for the Chief of Police anymore than it will be for the Attorney General to foreclose one of those paths by simply saying, "I'm not going to participate in this regulatory scheme."

One consequence, of course -- and I realize as a practical matter, Smithfield, according to the Chief, is not being deluged with applications; but, nonetheless, by the Chief taking this position, other than its it prejudice to Mr. Archer, he also thereby burdens the Attorney General with having to process Smithfield permit applications.

In any event, while the objective of the Chief may

system."

be very laudable -- I don't know, maybe the Chief's view is that no one other than law enforcement officials should have guns. I'm sure the Chief could find people with that opinion in every state in the union, but at this point in time people are permitted to have concealed weapons, according to the legislature, and they are afforded certain ways that they can go about getting the licenses.

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Mr. O'Connor argues strenuously that, look, there is an adequate remedy here; namely, go to the attorney general. But that's not the adequate remedy at law as contemplated by our practice or by equity juris prudence. We speak of an adequate remedy of law as being the so-called law side of the Court. that with the advent of the new Rules of Civil Procedure -- when I say new, I'm speaking in terms of centuries. They were new in the 1950's or 60's when they merged law and equity. Prior to that time there was the so-called law side of the Court and the equity side of the Court, and if someone wanted to get equitable relief, such as by a writ of mandamus, they had to demonstrate that there was no adequate remedy at law, meaning no remedy within the context of the common law in a court. well be that, and, indeed, it is, many times people come into this courtroom seeking some type of relief.

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Court, on their particular claim, may well have concurrent jurisdiction with the Family Court. It may well be that their claim also raises certain federal claims or questions that could appropriately be brought in the Federal Court, but if they are looking for equitable relief here, and the case is not otherwise removed to one of those other forums, then it is clear that -- and if they show that there is no adequate remedy of law, then they are entitled to adequate equitable relief. And it is not an adequate remedy of law to say, "Well, you could go to the Federal Court and get your parade permit" or "You could go to the Family Court and get your restraining order" for whatever reason, but that is not what an adequate remedy or the term adequate remedy at law contemplates. It means whether within the context of the common law there is some relief, adequate relief, I should say, and emphasize available, and here there is none.

Here, the question is very narrow: Should the Chief be compelled to do what he has no discretion to refuse to do, and he has been refusing to process the applications and, thereby, he doesn't even get to the question of scrutinizing the merits of the person's application because he takes the position that he won't exercise any discretion and consider the application,

and when the person meets the criteria, the chief will not issue a permit, but it is not for the chief or someone in his position to decline to receive applications and decline to process them in a reasonable and fair way.

In no way at this point in time am I telling the Chief what he must do with Mr. Archer's application. I am mandating, and a Writ of Mandamus shall issue to the Police Chief, William MacGarry, directing him to take an application from Mr. Archer, and, then, process it and conduct a review of the kind contemplated by the legislature in 11-47-11.

As I believe I emphasized thus far, so there is no mistake, the Police Chief has no discretion to decline an application or decline to consider the application once it has been filed with him. Nor does he have any discretion to act in anything but a reasonable and fair way regarding the application once it is on his desk.

Submit the Order, please.

(ADJOURNED)